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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
As the incidence of interstate war decreases, the academic interest in intrastate war is
increasing. While there was a brief period of interest in civil war in the 1960s, the study of
intrastate conflict experienced an upsurge in the 1980s, and the field continues to grow. While
the study of civil conflict, and the role of the international community in such conflict, grows,
the assumptions and foundations laid in the 1980s remain. There is continuity to the research of
civil war. Few questions have been asked, much less answered, about the assumptions that were
made previously, and whether they continue to serve today. Previous research has treated the
analysis of intrastate conflict as consistent despite the significant differences in motivations,
behaviors and outcomes between conflicts motivated by ethnicity and those motivated by
ideology. The theories supported by previous research are called into question by the conflation
of data regarding the conflicts. This study re-examines previous conclusions regarding foreign
intervention in intrastate conflict, focusing exclusively on secessionist conflicts. By focusing
solely on secessionist conflicts, this study attempts to establish the veracity of conclusions drawn
from previous research. While the results of previous studies are firmly established, those results
are accurate only if the entire universe of conflict is considered. The differences between ethnic
and ideological conflicts suggest that the same factors do not motivate intervention in both types
of conflict. Based on previous research, traits common to states who intervene are tested against
secessionist conflicts to determine if the states who intervene in secessionist conflicts share the
same traits.
It is necessary to establish a framework for understanding past research and reexamining
it in the context of secessionist conflicts, beginning with identifying civil war. Most researchers
studying civil wars utilize data from or related to the Correlates of War (COW) project,
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implicitly accepting Small and Singer’s definition of civil war. In order to qualify as a civil war,
the conflict must take place within the nation’s sovereign territory; have the active participation
of the recognized government; and have sustained, reciprocated violence on both sides with a set
threshold of deaths, usually 1,000 (Small and Singer 1982). This definition is broad, covering
hundreds of conflicts in the time period that COW covers, and offers little means for
differentiation between conflicts. There is a suggested commonality among conflicts that should
be rejected. Differences exist among civil wars which affect the escalation and duration of
violence as well as the resolution of the war. These differences which shape the conflict play a
role in the decision of states to intervene. By controlling for conflict type, the motives for
intervention may be differentiated for ethnic and ideological conflicts.
Civil wars can be differentiated by the reasons for the divisions between the fighting
parties. Ideological conflicts occur between parties who disagree on the governance of the state.
Ethnic conflicts are divided along racial or ethnic lines, and are fought over which group or
groups belong to the state and what belonging entitles them to (Kaufmann 2009). Ethnic civil
wars are concerned with territorial control, while ideological conflicts are concerned with the
loyalties of people and control of the government. Ethnic civil wars are less concerned with the
loyalties of people because movement between groups is impossible; ethnic identity is fixed by
birth (Kaufmann 2009). Ideological civil wars are decided by the number of supporters each side
can recruit; ethnic civil wars are determined by the balance of military force (Kaufmann 2009).
While ideological civil wars are persistent and difficult to resolve, ethnic civil wars can be
resolved, or at least active conflict ended, when an outside actor tips the balance of military
power. Differences in the potential outcome of conflicts suggest that states make different
intervention decisions, or possibly consider different factors in making the decision to intervene.
2

Previous research on foreign intervention in civil wars has looked at the broad range of
conflicts that fall within the definition of civil war, overlooking the intrinsic differences. But it is
often difficult to differentiate between ethnic and ideological conflicts. Leaders in an ethnic
conflict will make an ideological stand as a tactical maneuver to gain support (Kaufmann 2009).
While the conflict may be presented in ideological terms, the majority of participants on one side
will be from a single ethnic group, indicating that there is actually an ethnic conflict. Moreover,
a conflict may actually be between the government and multiple ethnic groups, all of which share
a common ideological view, though the differences between groups overwhelm the
commonalities (Kaufmann 2009). It is often difficult to discern the true basis of conflict when
both ideological and ethnic factors are present. The most clear cut indicator is the goal of the
government’s opposition: ethnic conflicts are predicated on demands for special rights and
recognitions; autonomy from the state; or secession to form their own state (Kaufmann 2009).
Ideological conflicts are disagreements over the people, principles, or policies which should
guide the state (Kaufmann 2009). The most important difference is that all parties to an
ideological civil war see themselves as members of the community, citizens of the state. This is
not true for ethnic conflicts, where the out group may not be seen by either side as legitimate
parties of the state (Kaufmann 2009).
Given the difficulties in disentangling the true nature of conflict, ethnic or ideological, it
is understandable that attempts to separate ethnic and ideological conflicts in analysis have not
been made, but as the dynamics and the determinants of success are different for each type of
conflict failing to differentiate between ethnic and ideological civil wars will potentially cause
distortions in the conclusions studies draw regarding the behavior of civil wars, especially
regarding the effect of intervention. The decisions states make to intervene are based on the
3

conditions of the conflict as well as those of the intervening state. Disregarding the conditions of
the civil war dilutes the insight of the research findings. As an attempt to indicate that the type
of civil war makes a difference in foreign intervention, this study will test previously proposed
hypotheses of determinants of foreign intervention on a dataset composed entirely of cases of
foreign intervention in separatist conflicts. Secessionist conflicts are entirely ethnic conflicts,
avoiding the risk of including ideological conflicts in the dataset. Limiting the conflicts solely to
ethnic conflicts will assist in determining if previous hypotheses regarding the motivations of
states to intervene apply to ethnic conflicts.
To demonstrate when intervention occurs, it is necessary to define what intervention
means in the context of this study. Intervention can include any number of activities, but is
normally classified as political, economic or military. Military intervention is ―move
ment of
regular troops or forces of one country into the territory or territorial waters of another country,
or forceful military action by troops already stationed by one country inside another, in the
context of some political issue or dispute‖ (Pearson and Baumann 1993). Military intervention is
the easiest form of intervention to recognize because while there may be political or economic
components, there is a clear line for deciding if military intervention occurs: the presence of
troops from a foreign state in the state in conflict. The cases of military intervention in this study
are taken from the International Military Intervention datasets (Pearson and Baumann 1993,
Kisangani and Pickering 2008). In order to identify interventions that are related to ethnic
conflicts, the interventions identified by the IMI datasets were compared to the Minorities at
Risk dataset to identify interventions involving states with active separatist movements
(Minorities at Risk Project 2009). Previous findings on the motivations of states to intervene in
civil wars, as well as hypotheses drawn from that research, are presented in chapter two. The
4

variables selected and the methodology used to test the data is put forth in chapter three. The
findings of the statistical tests are presented in chapter four. Tentative conclusions and
suggestions for further research are presented in the chapter five.

5

CHAPTER 2: FOREIGN INTERVENTION
Quantitative research on foreign intervention in internal conflicts has primarily focused on
considering conflicts in general, rather than on a certain class of conflicts. The findings of
previous studies provide insight into the dynamics of civil war and the role of intervention in
these conflicts. The question remains, however, whether these findings apply to all types of
conflict. In order to consider whether the conditions apply to secessionist conflicts, it is
necessary to lay out what conditions previous research indicates are most influential in
influencing the state’s decision to intervene.
In order for a state to intervene in a foreign conflict, that state must have the desire and
ability to do so, as well as an expectation that the intervention will be successful – that
intervention will bring about a resolution to the conflict in the way the intervening state desires.
Regan (1998) suggests that there are three prerequisites that states meet prior to becoming
involved in a foreign internal conflict: (1) there must be a reasonable expectation of success, (2)
the success must be achievable in a short timeframe, and (3) there must be domestic support for
the intervention (Regan 1998). The state must have a vested interest in the outcome to gain
domestic support, whether that interest stems from ethnic alliances or ideological beliefs. The
state must possess the resources to affect the intervention in order for the state to be reasonably
certain of success and to be able to predict a short event horizon, as well as having a clear
understanding of the conditions under which the intervention would be considered successful.
The conditions within the intervening state which must be present for interventions to occur have
been frequently studied. While state interest may be difficult to identify or quantify, the
conditions of states who decide to intervene are identifiable. Information regarding those
conditions is available for most states. Past studies have identified the location of a state, a
6

state’s governance, a state’s power, and a state’s relationship to the state involved in the conflict
and to other states in the international community as significant to the decision to intervene.
Additionally, research has suggested that an overarching international ideology may create an
environment which inhibits or supports interventions. While the conditions of the conflict have
not been extensively studied, one factor which has been found to be significant is the intensity of
the violence within the conflict.
2.1 Geographic Proximity
The location of a state is relevant in relation to the location of the conflict. The closer a state is
to the conflict, the more often they become involved in the conflict. Geographic proximity
decreases the cost of intervention and ―
affects the ability correctly to estimate the probability of
being successful‖ (Regan 1998). The potential for spillover from a neighboring conflict is high;
a state with shared borders may intervene to prevent violence within its own borders.
Furthermore, ethnic affinities are likely to extend across borders (Regan 1998). This factor is
especially salient when the non-state actor in the conflict is affiliated with the dominant group in
a neighboring state, as is the case in Cyprus. The ongoing conflict between the Turkish and
Greek nationals residing in Cyprus have been in conflict since 1974, when the state was divided
between the government controlled and Turkish controlled portions of the island (Bureau of
European and Eurasian Affairs, US Department of State 2010). In the ongoing conflict, the
Turkish portion of the country, which seeks to establish a separate government from the Greek
dominated government, has received support from Turkey, which is located less than 300 miles
from Cyprus (Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, US Department of State 2010). Khosla
(1999) concludes that ―c
ountries which are territorially contiguous to states embroiled in an
ethnic dispute are the most likely to become involved‖. Additionally, Carment and James
7

(1996) find that intervention in secessionist conflicts is most likely to come from states which are
territorially adjacent. Moreover, even without ethnic affinity, the state may be able to engender a
sense of obligation to support neighbors who are allies, or to facilitate a humanitarian desire to
end violence against a group within a neighboring state more easily than a state at a great
distance.
Geographic proximity does not affect all states equally. Pearson (1974) finds that large
powers are less constrained by geographic proximity. Pearson is careful to point out that
distance contributes a cost and that proximity constitutes an incentive to intervention. States that
can bear the cost of traversing a greater distance to become involved in a conflict are not
constrained from extending their reach across a greater distance, but the number of states who
have the capability to intervene across great distances is limited to very few states. The
contiguity argument suggests that a shared border increases the likelihood of intervention in a
conflict. Pearson, however, found little difference between the likelihood of intervention
between states that share a border and states within 1500 miles of each other (Pearson 1974).
This suggests that the common formula for proximity, number of shared borders, might be
applicable to states within the area even without shared borders. Though Pearson’s argument
suggests that a border is not required for proximity to hold true, a common border is the most
accessible means of assessing geographic proximity. The hypothesis related to geographic
proximity follows:
H1: States are more likely to intervene in secessionist conflicts within states with which
they share a border.
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2.2 Regime Type
Kegley and Hermann (1996), studying the use of intervention by democracies, find that
democracies are increasingly using military intervention as a tool to affect the change the
democratic state desires in the state in conflict. Democracies can justify intervention, regardless
of the regime in the state in which they are intervening, citing such high ideals as promoting and
restoring democracy, peace-keeping, or protecting minorities from persecution by their own
governments. Intervention is often seen as an effective alternative to economic sanctions and
trade embargoes (Kegley and Hermann 1996). However, as I reviewed the data cited by Kegley
and Hermann (1996), the analysis of Polity scores in every time period indicates that ―
Free‖ and
―
Partly Free‖ states intervene in nearly equal numbers with ―
Not Free‖ states. Nonetheless, the
Free‖ states intervening increases across the time periods noted, with the fewest
number of ―
democratic states intervening in the years 1974 – 79 and the most democratic states intervening
in the years 1986 – 91 (Kegley and Hermann 1996). In addition to the ideals that democracies
cite to motivate domestic support for foreign interventions, Pickering and Kisangani (2005)
discuss the state’s likelihood of using intervention in order to draw domestic attention from
internal problems, a tactic they refer to as diversionary military intervention. In these cases,
leaders struggling with domestic troubles will send troops to neighboring lands or distant shores
to bolster their political position. The rally-round-the-flag effect is perceived to be useful in
increasing approval ratings and improving a struggling economy in the intervening state. It has
been suggested that the proclivity to use this strategy varies by regime type. Democracies are
more likely to utilize foreign intervention as a method of consolidating political support, as
autocracies have other means of controlling the masses and require support from a significantly
smaller political elite. Therefore, the following hypothesis is proposed:
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H2: Democracies are more likely to intervene in secessionist conflicts than other regimes.
2.3 Power
States which possess greater resources, which have greater power, appear to be in a better
position to intervene in foreign conflicts. But possessing great power does not mean that the
state has the inclination to become involved in a conflict. In a study of intrastate conflicts during
the Cold War period, Tillema (1989) identifies the United States and the United Soviet Socialist
Republic as superpowers; China, France and the United Kingdom as secondary great powers;
and the remaining 92 states that engaged in intervention from 1945 to 1985 as minor powers.
From 1945 to 1985, the Soviet Union intervened only half as many times as the United States,
and far less than secondary great powers France and the United Kingdom (Tillema 1989).
Furthermore, some minor powers intervened as frequently, if not more so, as the great powers
during that time period. The two superpowers of this period, the US and the USSR, contributed
relatively little to the frequency of intervention; numerous minor states, each intervening
comparably rarely, account for the majority of foreign interventions (Tillema 1989). One such
instance was the intervention of India into Sri Lanka in 1987. In July 1987 the Indian Peace
Keeping Force (IPKF) entered the Jaffna region of Sri Lanka in order to disarm the Tamil
separatists and facilitate elections to accommodate Tamil demands for autonomy. The IPKF was
ultimately unsuccessful and was removed by Sri Lanka in 1989 (U.S. Library of Congress 1995).
This trend becomes more apparent in the later years of the period examined. After 1965, the
incidence of intervention by superpowers and secondary great powers declined, while
intervention rates remained stable (Tillema 1989). Overall, states with less power intervene
more frequently than powerful states. The hypothesis regarding power is as follows:
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H3: An inverse relationship exists between a state’s power and its likelihood to intervene
in a foreign secessionist conflict.
2.4 Ethnic Affinity
Perhaps the most significant tie between an intervening state and the state experiencing conflict
can be their citizens. Ethnic ties between people serve to motivate states to act to protect ethnic
kin exposed to violence due to civil war. Ethnic affinity may serve as an independent motivation
for domestic support of intervention, especially in ethnic conflicts. Carment and James (1996)
conducted a study focusing on intervention specifically in secessionist conflicts, civil wars in
which the non state party’s ultimate goal is independence. They found that secessionist conflicts
can lead to external intervention when ethnic groups invite external intervention based on
transnational ethnic affiliations of one or more states that support secession, and further that the
claims that support secession will only find resonance in states with ethnic affinity (Carment and
James 1996). In a quantitative study, Saideman (2002) found that ethnic kin increased the
likelihood of a secessionist group receiving broad and intense support. More populous ethnic
groups are able to assert more pressure on the state to act. Previous findings show the larger a
percentage of the population which shares ethnic kinship with an ethnic group in the state in
conflict, the more likely a state is to become involved in the conflict. To test this relationship in
the context of secessionist conflicts, the following hypothesis is proposed:
H4: Shared ethnic affinity increases the likelihood of a state intervening in a secessionist
conflict.
2.5 Colonial History
Relationships between states influence their behavior toward each other. States which were
previously colonies have a unique relationship to the states which were in control of them prior
11

to independence. Khosla (1999) explains that a colonial heritage influences the behavior of
states that were colonized as well as states that were colonizers because, together with the
importation of Western models of governance, an expectation of patronage and support is a
common attribute of third world states experiencing domestic conflict. A history of taking
responsibility for the problems of colonies influences the intervening state’s perception of the
needs and expectations of the state in conflict. Pearson (1974) explicitly found a colonial factor
in the interventions of France and the United Kingdom following WWII in civil wars. In order
to determine if this finding holds true for secessionist conflicts, the following hypothesis is
proposed:
H5: Former colonial powers are more likely to intervene in secessionist conflicts within
their former territories.
2.6 Presence of Other Interveners
In past instances of intervention, the presence of an intervening state played a role in a state’s
decision to intervene in a foreign internal conflict. Of post-WWII intrastate conflicts, 60%
received intervention; of those, 60% involved more than one intervener (Findley and Teo 2006).
Findley and Teo (2006) find that the intervention of a rival or an ally drastically increases the
likelihood of a state to intervene regardless of which side the intervention is on. This
bandwagoning effect may reduce cost to the intervening state and be tied to other reasons for
domestic support. The following hypothesis is proposed:
H6: The more states are intervening in a secessionist conflict, the more likely a state is to
intervene in the same conflict.
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2.7 Ideology
A shared belief across the international community may create an environment which affects the
During the Cold War any internal dispute
likelihood of foreign intervention. As Regan states, ―
could easily be cast in terms of the ideological contest waged between the East and West‖
(Regan 1998, 767). The international situation endorsed action to protect the side of the East –
West divide the state aligned with, such as the involvement of Israel in the Lebanese civil war,
which was influenced in part by US involvement in the war (Global Security 2006). While
Israel’s involvement was in part explained by religious alliances, Israel was also affected by the
relationship with the United States and the West as opposed to the surrounding states. The
following hypothesis is proposed to test the impact of ideology:
H7: Secessionist conflicts during the Cold War are more likely to receive intervention
than conflicts after.
2.8 Conflict Intensity
The intensity of violence in a conflict actually has differing effects on the likelihood of a foreign
state to intervene depending on the rationale that is accepted. On the one hand, Regan argues
that greater intensity reduces the likelihood of intervention, because more intense conflicts
require more substantial intervention to resolve (Regan 1998). The large cost and diminished
likelihood of success are perceived to be barriers to intervention. On the other hand, Saideman
(2002) argues that the likelihood of intervention increases with the level of intensity, with more
violent conflict resulting in a dramatic increase in strong or intense support. Carment and James
(1996) report that protracted ethnic conflicts share a great capacity for violent conflict and thirdparty intervention. Both the study by Carment and James and Saideman’s research focused on
secessionist conflicts, indicating this is an area that might be affected by the difference between
13

ideological and ethnic conflict. Following the evidence of previous inquiries, this study posits a
positive relationship between conflict intensity and intervention:
H8: The more violent a conflict, the more likely a state is to intervene.
While intervention in foreign
Table 1: Influences on state decision to intervene
to protect ethnic minorities in internal conflicts:
Hypotheses
Independent Variable
Expected
Relationship
Geographic Proximity
Positive
Regime Type
Positive
Power
Negative
Ethnic Affinity
Positive
Colonial History
Positive
Number of Intervening States
Positive
Ideology
Positive
Conflict Intensity
Positive

internal conflicts was once seen as
antithetical to state sovereignty, it is
becoming an accepted policy tool. Civil
war has always existed, as has the desire
to assist in resolving the problem.
Intervention is likely to increase as a
means of preventing transnational conflict.

Mitchell (1970) notes that there is a possibility that a class of states exists who respond to
situations of civil strife by involving themselves on one side or the other. He concedes, however,
that it is far more likely that it is a combination of factors, present in many states, rather than one
single factor, which identifies such states (Mitchell 1970). The previous research identifies a
number of attributes of intervening states, as well as factors within the secessionist conflict and
the international community which motivate states to become involved in the internal conflicts of
foreign states. The hypotheses in this chapter, referenced in Table 1, test Kaufmann’s assertions
that the differences between ethnic and ideological conflicts affect the motivations of states to
intervene in conflicts. If Kaufmann is correct, the influences that motivate intervention in general
will not be the same as though that apply only to ethnic conflicts and specifically secessionist
conflicts.
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CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY
To consider intervention in a foreign internal conflict, an intervening state must perceive
an interest in becoming involved and believe that a successful outcome can be achieved. The
factors which indicate a profitable situation are many, including the conditions discussed in
Chapter Two. For each year of a foreign intervention involving a state with an active separatist
group, an observation was coded identifying the presence of a shared ethnic affinity between the
state in conflict and the intervening state, the potential influence of an ideological premise, the
regime type of the intervening state, the number of states intervening in the conflict other than
the intervening state of the observation, the global power share of the intervening state, the
presence of a colonial relationship between the state in conflict and the intervening state, the
presence of a shared border between the intervening state and the state in conflict, and the
intensity of the conflict. The variables are examined in a combined probit model to examine the
significance of each variable and its effect on foreign intervention in a secessionist conflict. In
order to isolate secessionist conflicts, the observations are restricted to interventions involving
states with active secessionist groups.
3.1 Dependent Variable: Foreign Intervention
The dependent variable of this analysis is foreign intervention in secessionist movements.
Foreign intervention is measured in terms of intervening state – intervention – year as coded
from data in the International Military Intervention (IMI) datasets. The original IMI (OIMI)
dataset was collected by Frederic S Pearson and Robert A Baumann, and the revised edition was
released in 1992. The OIMI catalogued all instances of intervention between 1946 and 1988. In
2006, an update to the IMI (UIMI) dataset was compiled by Kisangani and Pickering,
cataloguing interventions from 1989 to 2005. The update utilizes the same coding system as the
15

OIMI dataset to expand the universe of available cases. In order to utilize the full span of
information, the two datasets were combined. The combination of cases brings the dates of the
IMI database into closer agreement with the Minorities at Risk dataset used for the independent
variables, which includes data from the 1960s to 2005. This study includes interventions from
1950 to 2003. The unit of analysis is intervening state – intervention – year; for each year,
observation is coded for each state intervening in a conflict. The OIMI and the UIMI cover the
universe of all military interventions, so the data was cross-referenced with the Minorities at
Risk (MAR) dataset. Only cases involving separatist groups active in the 25 year period
immediately prior to the publication of the MAR dataset were included, effectively limiting the
observations to conflicts involving secessionists. When the IMI data was cross-referenced with
the MAR dataset, the cases were also coded for the number of secessionist groups MAR
identifies in the state. The observations were modeled in two ways. First the dataset was
modeled with one observation per intervening state – intervention – year without reference to the
number of secessionist groups in the intervened upon state resulting in 345 observations. Second
the data was modeled with one observation per secessionist ethnic group within the state
intervened upon in each intervening state – intervention – year resulting in 494 observations. In
the second model a control variable was included for the number of active secessionist groups
identified by the MAR data in the intervened upon state. The two models are necessary to
identify the effect of multiple active separatist groups residing within the same state.
A measure of the intent of the intervening state, Social Protective Intervention, is used as
the dependent variable. The IMI codebook defines a Social Protective Intervention as an
intervention by a foreign power to protect a socio-ethnic faction or minority of the target country.
The dependent variable measures whether an intervention which occurred in a state with an
16

active separatist group occurred to impact the secessionists. A positive response within the
limited dataset is interpreted as an intervention in support of a secessionist conflict. Social
Protective Intervention is dichotomous, with the presence of social protective motivations coded
as 1, the absence as 0. Unclear cases are coded as missing data. Of the 345 interventions
identified in the combined IMI data, 88 cases are missing, 41 cases are positive for social
protective intervention, and the remaining 216 cases are not. It is clear that the majority of
interventions do not involve protection of an ethnic minority group, but the cases that do provide
important information concerning the role of foreign intervention in secessionist conflicts. Due
to the small number of observations in the dataset, the proportionately large number of missing
cases might skew the results of the probit regression. In order to control for that potential I
recoded the missing data. The statistical software package that I used to run the probit
regressions, STATA 10.1, indicated that the methodology used to estimate missing data is to fill
in the missing values with the observation following the missing observation. However, due to
missing values following missing values in the data, the software package was unable to estimate
all of the missing values. Using the same method, with one adjustment, I estimated the missing
data. For all missing values followed by an observation coded as zero, the missing values were
coded as zero. In instances where a string of missing values was followed by an observation
coded as one, only one intervention prior was coded as one and the remaining missing values
were coded as zero. Estimating the missing data in the model without ethnic group information
netted little change, increase the number of observations from 345 to 350. Estimating the
missing data in the model with ethnic group information from the MAR dataset included resulted
in a much more significant change, increasing the observations of Social Protective Intervention
from 494 to 654. Due to the high number of observations reported as zero, using zero as the
17

default seems prudent. The minimalization of observations coded as a social protective
intervention maintains the proportion of positive to negative responses reported in the data
provided. By estimating the missing data in this manner, I may have introduced a bias in the
data. It is likely that in erring cautiously, the observations of intervention to protect ethnic
minorities were underreported. The effect of underreporting positive cases of social protective
intervention would be reduced statistical significance and reduced marginal rate of change as
affected by the independent variables. Both the data with missing information and the corrected
information are included in the analysis.
3.2 Independent Variables
The independent variables identified from the hypotheses in the previous chapter are geographic
proximity, regime type, power, ethnic affinity, colonial history, number of other interveners,
ideology, and conflict intensity. Each of these variables is expected to contribute to the
motivation of a state to intervene in a secessionist conflict. The independent variables were
collected from the Minorities at Risk (MAR) dataset, the Polity IV dataset, and other relevant
sources. Descriptive statistics for both models of the dependent variable are provided in Table 2.
The estimation of missing data in the dependent variable did not affect the observations of the
independent variables; if the data was missing for an observation that is related to an estimated
observation of the dependent variable, the value was not estimated.
To measure ethnic affinity, information regarding the ethnic makeup of each state was
collected from The World Factbook (2010). Two independent variables were created. The first,
Shared Ethnicity, is a dichotomous variable indicating the presence of any ethnic group that is
present in the state in conflict in the intervening state as well. The second, % Same Ethnicity, is a
continuous variable indicating the percentage of the population that is affiliated with the ethnic
18

group that is present in both states. Both variables consider all of the ethnic groups, including
the dominant group in either state, because any ethnic group that is present in the state in conflict
is affected by the ongoing conflict between the parties involved in the conflict. The % Same
Ethnicity is included to test the hypothesis regarding the power of the group with shared
ethnicity in the intervening state. Interventions which are motivated to protect ethnic minorities
are expected to be associated with states which share ethnic ties. As discussed in the previous
chapter, the state may become involved in a conflict for ideological reasons, as was the case of
Israel’s intervention in the Lebanon civil war. In order to estimate the impact of ideology on
decisions to intervene, a timeframe in which ideology was a significant factor in intervention was
isolated. Theoretically, a demonstrable increase of interveners in this timeframe indicates that
ideology was a significant factor. The dichotomous variable Cold War indicates whether a
conflict occurred during the Cold War, between 1945 and 1991. The variable Cold War is
expected to be related to interventions motivated to protect an ethnic faction.
Regime type is operationalized using the Polity variable from the Polity IV dataset
(Polity IV Project 2009). Polity is an index of the democracy and autocracy scores coded by the
Polity IV project. Polity scores ranging from four to ten are coded as democratic, scores ranging
from negative four to negative ten are coded as autocratic, and scores ranging from three to
negative three are coded as anocratic. The use of Polity IV data is consistent with the MAR
dataset, which uses the same polity score, but coded in five year increments. The Polity IV
project collects data annually, so the five year span of the MAR data restricts the data
unnecessarily. The expected result for regime type is that higher values of the polity score are
associated with observations of social protective intervention.
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Table 2: Influences on state decision to intervene to protect ethnic minorities in internal conflicts:
Descriptive statistics

Shared Border

Model 1 & 2: No ethnic group
information
N Mean Std
Min
Max
Dev
350
0
1

Model 3 & 4: Ethnic group
information
N Mean Std
Min
Max
Dev
654
0
1

Polity

337

0.368 7.367

628 0.502 7.494

CINC

304

0.035 0.060 0.00007 0.284 594 0.031 0.053 0.00007 0.284

Shared

350

-

-

0

1

654

% Same
Ethnicity
Colonial
History
# of Other
Intervening
States
Cold War

323

0.175

.032

0

1

350

-

-

0

Rebellion

342

-9

10

-

-

-9

10

0

1

609 0.207 0.342

0

1

1

654

0

1

0

34

654 2.624 7.535

0

34

0

1

623

0

1

0

7

654 3.379 2.987

0

7

-

-

654 5.216 2.655

1

10

Ethnicity

Groups

350

350
-

4.331 9.974

-

-

3.374 2.956
-

-

-

-

-

-

As the dataset measures each act of intervention separately, for each case a variable is
added indicating the number of other states intervening in the conflict in the same year. While
this does not capture the interaction of the interveners, it still allows measurement of the impact
of multiple interveners. It is expected that the more interveners there are in a conflict, the more
likely a state is to intervene in a foreign secessionist conflict. The presence of other interveners
is measured by looking for other cases of intervention in the same time and place as coded by the
IMI. For each observation, if an intervention occurred in the same state in the same year, it is
counted as an additional intervening state. The variable, labeled # of other intervening states
ranges from zero to 34. If no other interventions occurred in the same state in the same year, the
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variable is coded as zero. It is included for each observation in both datasets. In previous studies,
power has been identified as a combination of financial and military strength (Pearson 1974,
Tillema 1989, Khosla 1999). Following this pattern, this study uses an indexed measure of
global power share from the COW data that incorporates military and economic power along
with other measures of development. This continuous variable is labeled CINC, which is the
same label used in the COW dataset. The expected result is that lower values of CINC will be
related to positive observations of Social Protective Intervention.
In order to measure the impact of colonial history, the dichotomous variable Colhistory
indicates for each case whether there is a history of colonial control between the intervener and
intervened state. The information on colonial control is collected from the US State Department
Background Notes for each country (2010). The expected result is that positive observations of
Colhistory will be associated with positive observations of Social Protective Intervention. For
each case, a dichotomous variable for whether there is a shared border between the intervener
and intervened state, Shared Border, is included in the data. Because the dependent variable is
intervening state – intervention – year, conflicts in which countries with a shared border do not
intervene are not included in the data.

The expected result is that the presence of a shared

border will be associated with a positive observation for Social Protective Intervention.
The level of violence of an internal conflict is difficult to operationalize directly as it can
be a subjective measure. In the case of the MAR dataset, the level of violence is categorized in a
rebellion index, labeled Rebel Index, in five year time spans between 1945 and 1999. The
rebellion index includes eight categories: no reported activity, political banditry and sporadic
terrorism, local rebellions, small-scale guerilla activity, intermediate guerilla activity, large-scale
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guerilla activity, and protracted civil war. For the period spanning 1985 through 2000, there is
an additional annual rebellion index labeled Reb Index using the same eight categories. In both
categories missing data are coded as 99, no basis for judgment. Since the indices cover two
different time spans, the information was converted into a single index labeled Rebellion. The
expected result is that interventions to protect ethnic minorities are associated with higher values
of the rebellion index.
3.3 Analysis
The basic hypothesized relationship between the independent variables is additive. Each
factor is believed to affect the likelihood of international support independently of the behavior
of the other factors. The variables will be tested using a probit estimation, a measure of the
likelihood of the dependent variable’s change based on the change in the independent variable.
This test is appropriate because the dependent variable is dichotomous. Both the model with
observations for each intervening state and the model with observations for each ethnic group in
the intervened upon state were tested. Additionally, each model was tested with both the
dependent variable with the estimated data input and the dependent variable with the missing
data. The result is four different probit estimations. The probit estimations are presented in
chapter four. The marginal rate of change is reported for each statistically significant variable.
For each model, the marginal rates of change are calculated with all variables with z scores less
than 1.5 held at zero, and all variables with z scores more than 1.5 held at their means. Though
variables are statistically significant at 2, values above 1.5 are likely to affect the marginal rates
of change. The marginal rates of change of statistically significant variables are reported in
Table 3.
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CHAPTER 4: QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS
The hypotheses proposed in chapter two were tested using each of the four models
identified in chapter three. The hypotheses, drawn from civil war literature, are known to have
an effect on intervention in civil wars, but have not been tested specifically as related to
secessionist conflicts with the exception of hypotheses regarding ethnic affinity. The hypotheses
are tested against cases of intervention to determine if they are related in a statistically significant
manner to interventions which occurred to protect an ethnic minority. The four models are
distinguished by the inclusion or exclusion of information on ethnic groups as reported by the
Minorities at Risk project and the inclusion or exclusion of estimated data for the dependent
value, Social Protective Intervention. Model one has the smallest amount of data, and model
four has the greatest amount of data. The more information that is included in each model, the
more information that the results provide. The statistically significant results for all four models
are provided in Table 3.
Model one has only one statistically significant result, a negative relationship between
regime type and intervention. According to this model, as the value of the Polity score moves
from negative nine to ten the likelihood that an intervention occurs to protect an ethnic minority
decreases by 25 percent when SharedBorder, SharedEthnicity, Colhistory,
#ofOtherInterveningStates and Rebellion are held at zero and all other variables are held at the
mean. Model two provides statistically significant results for two variables, power and ethnic
affinity. In this model, as the state’s share of global power increases from zero to 28 percent, the
probability that an intervention occurs to protect an ethnic minority increases by 56 percent. As
the portion of the intervening state’s population that shares an ethnic tie to a group within the
intervened upon state increases from zero to one hundred percent of the population, the
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Table 3 Probit Model: Foreign intervention in internal conflicts in order to protect ethnic minorities
Model
1

Marginal
Changes in
Probabilities
-

Model
2

Model
3

-

Marginal
Changes in
Probabilities
-

-

Marginal
Changes in
Probabilities
-

Model
4

Shared
Border

-

Polity

-0.04
(0.015)

-0.254

-

-

-

-

0.031
(0.01)

0.166

CINC

-

-

7.465
(2.108)

0.561

6.947
(2.226)

0.337

8.18
(1.579)

0.612

Shared
Ethnicity

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

%Same
Ethnicity

-

-

1.603
(0.376)

0.55

2.311
(0.322)

0.673

1.359
(0.251)

0.454

Colhistory

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

# of Other
Intervening
States

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

Cold War

-

-

-

-

0.65
(0.184)

0.13

0.45
(0.151)

0.123

Rebellion

-

-

-

-

0.068
(0.03)

0.085

-

-

-

-

-0.081
(0.03)

-0.197

Groups

N
log
likelihood
LR χ2(df)
Pseudo R2

0.701
(0.205)

Marginal
Changes in
Probabilities
0.171

345
-115.06978

350
-112.51783

494
-146.41122

654
-230.85518

18.18 (9)
0.0732

42.80 (9)
0.1598

120.48 (10)
0.2915

92.25 (10)
0.1665

probability that an intervention occurs to protect an ethnic minority increases by 55 percent. For
both of the marginal rates of change, the value of Polity, SharedEthnicity, Colhistory and
#ofOtherInterveningStates are held at zero and all other variables are held at their means. The
difference between model one and model two is the inclusion of the estimated data for the
dependent variable, Social Protective Intervention.
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Model three has numerous statistically significant results, and in model four all but two
of the variables are statistically significant. In the third model, power, ethnic affinity, ideology
and rebellion are statistically significant. As the intervening state’s share of global power
increases from 0.007 percent to 28 percent, the probability that an intervention occurs to protect
an ethnic minority increases by 34 percent. As the portion of the intervening state’s population
that shares an ethnic tie to a group within the intervened upon state increases from zero to one
hundred percent of the population, the probability that the intervention occurs to protect an
ethnic minority increases by 67 percent. When an intervention occurred during the Cold War,
the probability is 13 percent greater that the intervention occurred to protect an ethnic minority.
As the level of violence within a separatist conflict increases from zero to seven along the MAR
rebellion index, the probability that an intervention occurs to protect an ethnic minority increases
by 9 percent. For the marginal rates of change in model three SharedBorder, Polity,
SharedEthnicity, Colhistory, #ofOtherInterveningStates and Groups are held at zero and all other
variables are held at their means. The difference between model one and model three is the
inclusion of observations for each ethnic group within the intervened upon state for each
intervening state – intervention – year.
Model four has both the most explanation of the variance between expected and observed
results and the greatest number of statistically significant variables. In model four, geographic
proximity, regime type, power, ethnic affinity, ideology and the number of ethnic groups within
the intervened upon state are all statistically significant. In model four, the presence of a shared
border between the intervening state and the intervened upon state increases the probability that
an intervention occurs to protect an ethnic minority by 17 percent. As the Polity index score
increases from negative nine to ten, the probability that an intervention occurs to protect an
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ethnic minority increases by 17 percent. As the intervening state’s share of global power
increases from 0.007 percent to 28 percent, the probability that an intervention occurs to protect
an ethnic minority increases by 61 percent. As the portion of the intervening state’s population
that shares an ethnic tie to a group within the intervened upon state increases from zero to one
hundred percent of the population, the probability that the intervention occurs to protect an
ethnic minority increases by 45 percent. When an intervention occurred during the Cold War,
the probability is 12 percent greater that the intervention occurred to protect an ethnic minority.
As the number of active secessionist groups in a state increases, the probability that an
intervention occurs to protect an ethnic minority decreases by 20 percent. For the marginal rates
of change of model four SharedEthnicity, Colhistory and #ofOtherInterveningStates are held at
zero and all other variables are held at their means. The difference between model one and
model four is that the fourth model incorporates both the data estimation of model two and the
information on ethnic groups of model three.
While there is value to all four models presented here, the inclusion of information
concerning the ethnic groups identified by the Minorities at Risk project for each intervening
state – intervention – year increases the relevance of the findings. While the argument could be
made that the information on ethnic groups merely inflates the number of observations, thus
increasing the statistical significance of the independent variables, the statistical significance of
the variable for the total number of active secessionist groups within the state in model four
suggests the number of groups is relevant to the decision to intervene to protect an ethnic
minority. The increase of the explanatory power of the models and the number of statistically
significant variables produced by including the estimated data for Social Protective Intervention
indicates the value of this data. Model four, with both the estimated data and information on
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ethnic groups for each intervened upon state, provides a measure of model fit on par with the
other models and the greatest number of statistically significant variables.
The presence of a common border increasing a state’s decision to intervene is statistically
significant in model four. As Regan and Pearson found in previous studies, there is a
relationship between a state’s proximity to a conflict and the decision to intervene. Hypothesis
one is supported by the results. The relationship between regime type and intervention is
statistically significant in model four. As Kegley and Hermann and Pickering and Kisangani
found, there is a relationship between democracy and intervention. Hypothesis two is supported
by the results. The relationship between power and intervention is statistically significant in
model four. While Tillema indicates there is a negative relationship between state power and
intervention, the results of the model indicate a positive relationship between power and
intervention. Hypothesis three is not supported by the results; rather the results are the opposite
hypothesized. This is the most important result of the analysis for two reasons: first because the
results are in opposition to the hypothesized relationship, and second because the share of global
power is statistically significant in models two, three and four, indicating that power has more of
an effect than variables that are only statistically significant in one model. The finding that a
state’s power is positively associated with intervention in a secessionist conflict indicates that
states with more power might be motivated by humanitarian concerns to protect ethnic
minorities. While the presence of a shared ethnic group is not statistically significant in any of
the models, the proportion of the population of the intervening state which shares an ethnic tie
with the intervened upon state is statistically significant in model four. As expected, the results
confirm the findings of Saideman and Carment and James. Hypothesis four is supported by the
results. The effect of ideology on a state’s decision to intervene is statistically significant in
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model four. As Regan suggests, the decision to intervene in conflicts during the Cold War
appears to have been affected by the international environment that the Cold War created.
Hypothesis seven is supported by the results of model four. The total number of ethnic groups
residing in the intervened upon state is statistically significant in model four. Though the
variable was not suggested by previous research, it is supported by the evidence. As there was
not a proposed hypothesis, the negative relationship between the total number of groups and
social protective intervention stands on its own. Hypothesis five, that an intervening state with a
colonial history to the intervened upon state is more likely to intervene to protect an ethnic
minority, is not supported the results. The variable Colhistory is not statistically significant in
model four, or in any of the models tested. Hypothesis six, that the greater the number of states
intervening in a conflict, the more likely a state is to become involved, is not supported by the
results. The variable # of Other Intervening States is not statistically significant in model four or
in any of the models tested. Hypothesis eight, that a greater level of violence leads to a greater
amount of intervention, is not supported by the results. The variable Rebellion is not statistically
significant in model four.
While many of the hypotheses drawn from previous research are relevant to intervention
in secessionist conflicts, not all are relevant and not all relationships are in the direction
hypothesized. That the results do not mirror the findings from previous research provides
support for Kaufmann’s argument that the fundamental differences between ethnic and
ideological conflicts affect the decision of states to become involved in secessionist conflicts.
The low value for the measure of model fit indicates there is much about intervention in
secessionist conflicts that is not explained by these hypotheses supported by previous research on
intervention in civil war. The statistically significant results for the role of the number of ethnic
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groups in determining intervention in a secessionist conflict is a step in the right direction,
providing an additional factor that motivates states to intervene in secessionist conflicts.
They also suggest that when studying secessionist conflicts, the nature of both the intervening
state and the state in conflict are important in determining the influences on intervention.
Kaufmann suggests that the underlying differences between ethnic and ideological
conflicts lead to differences in the onset and resolution of conflicts, and of especial importance,
differences in the motivations of states to become involved in internal conflicts. Previous
research on intervention had incorporated all available data on intervention, with few studies
considering the basis of the conflict as a factor in outside states’ motivation to intervene in
foreign conflicts. The models tested here strongly indicate that not all of the influences that
contribute to intervention are significant in ethnic conflicts. Colonial history, the number of
intervening states and the level of violence in a conflict have all previously been found to
contribute to a state’s decision to intervene, though they are not significant in this analysis.
Additionally, previous research has not determined all of the influences that contribute to
intervention in secessionist conflicts. The total number of ethnic groups in the intervened upon
state was included as a control variable and was found to play a significant role in the decision of
a state to intervene in a secessionist conflict. At the same time, some influences continue to be
of importance, though not necessarily in the same ways. The best example of that result is the
most important finding of this analysis. While previous research has posited that power plays a
significant role, and even suggested that there is a negative relationship between power and
intervention in foreign civil wars, the results here indicate that more powerful states are more
likely to intervene in secessionist conflicts. Overall, these findings confirm Kaufmann’s
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explanation of the effect of differences between ethnic and ideological conflicts on states’
motivations to intervene in conflicts.
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION
According to Kaufmann, the differences in motivation, conflict escalation, and conflict
resolution influence the decision states make to intervene in foreign conflicts. In quantitative
studies, the difficulty has been that the data utilized consolidates all incidences of foreign
intervention in order to amass enough incidences of intervention to result in statistically
significant findings. Foreign military interventions, particularly those undertaken to protect a
minority group within the state involved in a conflict, are rare. Further, because interventions
occur in states in conflict, data are often incomplete or inaccurate. Given the difficulties
associated with collecting the information necessary to reach any conclusions, the decision to use
all available information on intervention makes practical sense. But it also confounds the results,
making assessment of states’ motivations difficult. Given the available data on state behavior,
intervention to protect an ethnic minority within the state in conjunction with an active
secessionist group in the intervened upon state is interpreted as an intervention in a secessionist
conflict. Restricting the available data to parameters which indicate foreign intervention in a
secessionist conflict reduces the number of observations. The low number of observations and
the relatively large amount of missing data in the dependent variable is related to the large
number of results which are not statistically significant in models one, two and three. In order to
increase the statistical significance the missing observations of the dependent variable were
estimated and the active secessionist groups within the intervened upon state were included in
model four. Model four provides the most significant results. Data are missing for a significant
number of observations in the independent variables which were not estimated. The missing
observations in the dependent variable were considered necessary to draw conclusions on the

31

hypotheses, but estimation is not the most reliable means of achieving results. These missing
data need to be addressed in future research.
Geographic proximity has long been supported as a factor in a state’s decision to
intervene in foreign conflicts. While other studies have looked to the number of states that a
state in conflict borders, this study has focused on the presence of a shared border between the
intervening state and the state in conflict. The results support hypothesis one, that states are
more likely to intervene in a secessionist conflict in a bordering state. The regime type argument
is supported by the model. The linear relationship indicates that as the Polity score moves from
entrenched autocracy to liberal democracy, the state becomes more apt to intervene in a
secessionist conflict. While the results suggest that Democratic regimes intervene more
frequently as proposed in hypothesis two, the results do not indicate support for the Democratic
peace research because the results say nothing about the regime in the intervened upon state.
Future research needs to address the legitimate and illegitimate regime within the state in
conflict.
The relationship between a state’s power and its likelihood to intervene in a foreign
secessionist conflict was statistically significant. The relationship is opposite that indicated by
previous research. This is the only hypothesis that was negated by the results in the model.
More research is necessary to confirm whether the negation of Tillema’s argument is a fluke or
whether more powerful states do indeed intervene more frequently in secessionist conflicts. The
presence of shared ethnic ties increases the likelihood of intervention, but there are limits to its
effect. While the dichotomous measure of the presence of the same ethnic group in both states
was not statistically significant in any of the models, the measure of the proportion of the
intervening state with ethnic ties to the intervened upon state was statistically significant. This
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supports the argument that it is not merely the presence but the power of the shared ethnic group
that affects the state’s likelihood to intervene in a foreign secessionist conflict. The size of an
ethnic group, which is used as a proxy for the political power of the ethnic group, has a positive
relationship with the probability of intervention in secessionist conflicts. It is important to note
that in this study the presence of the ethnic group has not been tied to the parties to the conflict.
This is interesting as it indicates that states will act to protect groups to whom their citizens are
connected even if they are not directly involved in the violence. In future research it would be
worthwhile to indicate whether the ethnic groups are party to the violence or not. Additionally,
the presence of the same shared ethnicity on both sides of a conflict diminishes the likelihood
that a foreign state will become involved. In the conflict between Eritrea and Ethiopia, the
majority of ethnic groups in either state were in both states. The result was that there were no
interveners in the conflict with ethnic ties to the parties in the conflict (Bureau of African
Affairs, US Department of State 2010). This effect may be present in other cases, so the effort
needs to be put forth to identify ethnic ties shared between parties in both the territory and state
in conflict. Further, it becomes evident that there is a conflation of the importance of shared
borders and shared ethnicity, as ethnic groups tend to reside in multiple neighboring countries.
The close geographic ties of states sharing large numbers of ethnic kin makes it theoretically
difficult to distinguish between interventions to support ethnic kin in a neighboring state and
interventions to control conflict within a neighboring state for other reasons.
The relationship between a former colonial relationship and its likelihood to intervene in
a foreign secessionist conflict was statistically insignificant, suggesting that the relationship is
inconsequential. It is likely that the significance of the colonial relationship has decreased the
farther the colonial relationship is from the onset of violence. In order to test the relationship of
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colonial history in the future, the colonial history variable should take into account the year in
which independence occurred. The hypothesized relationship between the number of states
intervening and the likelihood of a state deciding to intervene in the same conflict was not
statistically significant. Additionally, the results are opposite of the hypothesized relationship.
The lack of statistical significance suggests that the variable has little effect on the likelihood of a
state to intervene in a foreign secessionist conflict, but the evidence suggests a negative
relationship. This may be in part due to the role of international governmental organizations,
which are able to coordinate the efforts of multiple states but also mask the involvement of the
individual states contributing troops to the interventions. In a number of examples, international
organizations have contributed to the conflict. In East Timor, The United Nations Security
Council called on Indonesia to withdraw its troops from East Timor in 1975, and the UN assisted
in verifying the referendum results that led to independence and aided in establishing a
government for the new state in 1999 (Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, US Department
of State 2010). In Eritrea, it was the UN decision in 1952 to federate Ethiopia and Eritrea that
led to the state’s annexation and loss of autonomy. The UN played a further role in facilitating a
new government for Ethiopia which acceded to Eritrea’s demands for independence in 1993
(Bureau of African Affairs, US Department of State 2010). The insertion of NATO
peacekeeping troops directly impacted the end of the conflict between Albanian and Serbian
nationals in Kosovo by causing the Serbian withdrawal from Kosovo. The UN played a role in
the negotiations on determining the final status of Kosovo (Bureau of European and Eurasian
Affairs, U.S. Department of State 2010). In Georgia, the UN has attempted to prevent more
violence and set a committee to monitor the situation in South Ossetia, though Russia and its
allies have successfully blocked all current UN proposals (Bureau of European and Eurasian
34

Affairs, US Department of State 2010). The Ossetian government has ejected all Georgian
peacekeepers from South Ossetia; only Russian peacekeepers remain in the territory (Global
Security 2008). The government has refused to allow the international community to become
involved in the conflict. Only observers from international organizations have been allowed, and
those are forced to remain on the Georgian side of the security zone (Global Security 2008). In
Abkhazia, international peacekeepers from the UN have maintained the cease fire between
Abkhazia and Georgia and have continued to attempt to open talks between the governments
(Global Security 2008). International organizations play a significant role in secessionist
conflicts, both in positive and negative ways. Incorporating analysis of factors which motivate
the state to intervene and factors which motivate international organizations to intervene in
secessionist conflicts is an interesting direction for future research.
The attempt to identify ideology may have missed the mark. It is unclear whether the
Cold War had a significant international ideological impact capable of influencing the behavior
of states to intervene in foreign secessionist conflicts. The statistical relationship between the
Cold War variable and the likelihood to intervene in foreign secessionist conflicts may be due to
the long time period; the majority of observations in all the datasets fall within this time period.
It may also be due to a broad Cold War effect w is not ideology affecting the probability of
intervention. The conditions of the Cold War may have spurred more intervention in some areas,
such as Pakistan, but some interventions were not possible during the Cold War, such as the
NATO intervention in Kosovo. A more precise means of testing ideology needs to be found to
facilitate further research on ideology. The level of violence in a secessionist conflict is
positively associated with the likelihood of a foreign state to intervene in a foreign secessionist
conflict, but the results were not statistically significant. The data indicates that interventions
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tend to occur in the most violent and most peaceful conflicts, with few interventions occurring in
the middle of the spectrum. Future research should analyze the curvilinear nature of the conflict
intensity argument.
In limiting this study to military intervention, the study is overly restrictive. Other forms
of intervention are also used to affect change in foreign secessionist conflicts. Choosing to
identify intervention in either/or terms is likely an inadequate means of explaining intervention.
A more accurate way of discussing intervention may be in a Likert scale, similar to the method
used to code rebellion, with higher values indicating more intense involvement. Attempting to
codify the nature of interventions is a task for future research. With regards to the conflicts that
states and other actors choose to intervene in, conflicts involving secessionist groups with a
previous history, even a distant one, of independence receive greater international support.
Eritrea was an independent region prior to colonization and confederation with Ethiopia by the
UN (Bureau of African Affairs, US Department of State 2010). East Timor was independent
prior to Portuguese colonization and briefly prior to Indonesian occupation (Bureau of East
Asian and Pacific Affairs, US Department of State 2010). The success of their secessionist
movements may in part be attributed to the ability to tell their nationalist myth in a legitimate
way, a way that has veracity for the audience – the international community.
As studies rarely focus exclusively on secessionist conflicts, factors which may be of
interest only in these instances may not have support in the literature, and thus have been
overlooked in the quantitative analysis. Successful secessionist groups are uncommon, but those
that have been successful share some traits that might be related to their success. In the cases of
East Timor and Eritrea, both territories which eventually became independent states are
extremely small, with populations between one and six million people. These territories are also
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very poor and rely heavily on foreign aid to support their economy. There is little development
of industry within these territories. Both regions are on the outskirts of regions – on the African
coast, on the edge of an archipelago of islands. These positions on the margin – economically,
socially, developmentally, geographically – may be relevant to determining the outcome of the
conflicts. However, by their nature secessionist conflicts stem from marginalized communities.
Secessionists by definition are minorities, the people on the fringes of society. By addressing the
marginalization of secessionist groups, the impact of a group’s location on the margin might be
addressed.
While previous research on intervention in civil wars has much to contribute to the
understanding of intervention in secessionist conflicts, it does not tell the whole story. Some of
the influences remain strong indicators of motivation for intervention, such as geographic
proximity. Some of the influences tell a different story from the one discovered by previous
researchers, such as the effect of power. Several of the factors that have been shown to attribute
to intervention in civil wars had no statistical significance to intervention in secessionist
conflicts, such as colonial history and conflict intensity. The results also suggest avenues for
future research, variables that have not been drawn from previous research on civil wars, but are
unique to the study of secessionist conflicts. Overall, the results support Kaufmann’s argument
that the intrinsic differences between ethnic and ideological conflicts result in differing
motivations for intervention. Ethnic conflicts are substantively different from ideological
conflicts, and those differences do make a difference in how foreign states respond to those
conflicts, especially in the context of intervention.
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